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Case Notes
People v. Brisendine: Search and Seizure
in California
I. INTRODUCTION
People v. Brisendine' is a search and seizure case arising under
art. I, sec. 132 of the California Constitution. The case defines the
authority for the permissible scope of a warrantless search of the
person and effects of a suspect arrested for a minor non-vehicular
offense.8
1. 13 Cal. 3d 528, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 531 P.2d 1099 (1975). Opinion
by Mosk, J., with Wright, C.J., Tobriner and Sullivan, JJ., concurring. Sep-
arate dissenting opinion by Burke, J., pro. tern., with McComb and Clark,
JJ., concurring.
2. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13 (former art. I, § 19) (West Supp. 1975) pro-
vides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated;
and a warrant may not issue except on probable cause, supported by oath
or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched and the per-
sons and things to be seized."
3. See People v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 186, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837, 496
P.2d 1205 (1972) (hereinafter cited as Simon) for the Court's holding on
the permissible scope of a warrantless search of a suspect arrested for an
ordinary vehicle violation. The Court's reaffirmation of the holding in
Simon that a search for weapons following a minor traffic arrest is imper-
missible unless there are specific, articulable facts or circumstances giving
the arresting officer reasonable grounds to believe that the driver is in pos-
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The Court addressed itself to two fundamental constitutional
issues: First, the permissible scope of a warrantless search by law
enforcement officers of the person and effects of a suspect arrested
for a minor non-vehicular offense. Second, the effect that the Cali-
fornia Supreme ,Court should give to the United States Supreme
Court's recent decisions in United States v. Robinson4 and Gus-
tafson v. Florida5 defining the permissible scope of a warrantless
search of the person and effects of a suspect arrested for a minor
vehicular offense under the Fourth Amendment.
The Court held that the permissible scope of a warrantless search
of the person and effects of a suspect arrested for a minor non-
session of a weapon was a determinative factor in the majority's decision
limiting the scope of the search in the nonvehicular situation found in Bri-
sendine.
4. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). Defendant Robinson
was arrested for operating a vehicle after revocation of his operator's per-
mit. A full field search of defendant at the scene of the arrest revealed
fourteen gelatin capsules of heroin in a crumpled cigarette package in his
coat pocket. The heroin was later admitted into evidence against defendant
in a prosecution for possession of heroin. The Supreme Court held that
in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person was both
an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and also
a reasonable search not violative of the proscription contained in the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 224-237. The Court distinguished Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968) on the ground that Terry did not involve a search incident
to an arrest but a search incident to an investigatory stop based on less
than probable cause to arrest. Id. at 233-35.
5. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973) is a companion case to
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), both decided on December
11, 1973. Defendant Gustafson was placed under custodial arrest for failure
to have his operator's license on his possession. A full field search revealed
marijuana inside an ordinary cigarette package in the defendant's pants
pocket. The marijuana was subsequently admitted into evidence in a
prosecution against defendant for possession. The Supreme Court upheld
the search on the basis of its opinion in Robinson, supra note 4. The Court
stated that no constitutional significance attached to the fact that the en-
forcement regulation did not require the defendant to be taken into custody.
The Court held that the custodial arrest itself gave rise to the authority
to search. Id. at 263-66.
The combined effect of Robinson and Gustafson is that one who has con-
traband or evidence of any crime on his person subjects himself to the risk
that it can be validly seized if he is searched incident to a custodial arrest.
In addition to stating the applicable rule under the Fourth Amendment,
Robinson and Gustafson have been judicially adopted to date in Indiana,
Wisconsin, Oklahoma, and Missouri as a state standard. See People v. Bri-
sendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 551, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 333, 531 P.2d 1099, 1117.
See also, infra note 44.
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vehicular offense where specific, articulable facts initially warrant
a limited weapons search does not include a search into seeable
commonplaces. The Court further held that the search in the
instant case was violative of the State's "more exacting standard"
under art. I, sec. 13 as construed by recent precedent and refused
to adopt the federal "minimum standards" as defined in Robinson
and Gustafson.
Because of the importance that attaches to the Court's independ-
ent stance in this area of criminal procedure, this note examines
the development of the Court's opinion in the instant case in the
context of the recent State and federal search and seizure case law.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On the night of June 3, 1970, two deputy sheriffs arrested
defendant Brisendine and three other companions for having an
open fire in a "high fire hazard area" of the San Bernardino
National Forest in violation of a county fire ordinance.0
A short time prior to the Brisendine arrest, the same officers had
arrested another camper in the vicinity for possession of marijuana.
This camper had provided the officers with information regarding
both the location and the existence of marijuana at the Brisen-
dine camp.
At the time of the initial arrest of Brisendine and the other
campers for the fire ordinance violation, the officers had no inten-
tion of placing the youths in custodial arrest. The officers did, how-
ever, desire to escort the defendant and his companions from their
campsite because camping was prohibited at that location and
because the officers had left their citation books in their vehicle
Defendant Brisendine and the other youths were without personal
identification at the time of the arrest.
Prior to starting the journey back to the officers' vehicle, the
two deputy sheriffs conducted a "lengthy and exhaustive" search
of the persons and effects of the campers ostensibly for weapons.
In the course of the weapons search, one officer picked up defend-
ant Brisendine's knapsack, determined that it was too solid to
ascertain if weapons were inside it and thereupon began a search
into the interior of the knapsack. In the course of this search, the
officer took from the knapsack and opened 1) an opaque, plastic
bottle containing marijuana and 2) a number of envelopes contain-
ing dangerous drugs wrapped in tinfoil.
6. Uniform Fire Code of San Bernardino County, appendix E, § 13.
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With the search ended and the contraband seized, the two officers
then escorted the four campers, with all their personal effects, from
the campsite to the patrol car. The officers allowed the campers
to retain possession of a hunting knife and a camping hatchet dur-
ing the journey. The journey was physically difficult, involving
nighttime travel without a flashlight along ill-defined forest paths
in a primitive surrounding. The defendant and companions made
no attempt to obstruct or to delay the journey; nor did they make
any attempt to escape.
Defendant Brisendine was charged with possession of marijuana
and possession of a restricted dangerous drug; his motion to sup-
press evidence on the ground of illegal search and seizure was
denied by the trial court. Following an unsuccessful petition for
mandamus, the defendant was found guilty on both counts and
placed on probation. The defendant appealed from an order grant-
ing probation, contending that the contraband was obtained by
means of an unlawful search and seizure.
III. THE ISSUE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE
The defendant's threefold argument was that the search was
either exploratory in nature, unjustified by the circumstances, or
excessive in scope. Specifically, the defendant contended 1) that
the search was exploratory for contraband rather than a search
for weapons; 2) that there were no specific, articulable circum-
stances which reasonably warranted a weapons search in the first
instance; and 3) that even assuming a limited weapons search was
legal in the first instance, that the search as conducted exceeded
its legitimate scope.
The Court rejected the defendant's first two contentions, but con-
curred with his third argument.
A. The motivation for the search.
While the Court noted that there existed evidence upon which
the trial court could have ruled that the weapons search was merely
a facade to justify an exploratory search for narcotics, it refused
to disturb the trial court's implied finding that the search was for
the purpose of discovering weapons and not contraband. 7
7. The Court noted, for example, that the officers acted upon the advice
of an informant who suggested that the Brisendine camp possessed mari-
B. The specific articulable circumstances authorizing the weapons
search: An analogy to Simon.
The defendant's second contention was that even assuming that
the search was not exploratory but was for weapons, the search was
nonetheless illegal because the officers could not point to specific,
articulable facts to initially justify such a weapons search.
The Court held that inasmuch as the intent of the officers prior
to finding the contraband was to cite the defendant for his viola-
tion of the fire ordinance and to release him immediately there-
after that the instant situation was analogous to procedures fol-
lowed under a minor vehicle arrest. The Court was faced with this
fact situation in People v. Superior Court (hereinafter Simon).s
In Simon the same court held that the permissible scope of a search
incident to an ordinary traffic arrest was conditioned upon three
discernible categories created by the provisions of the vehicle and
penal codes, as follows:
[Category One] [T]hose who are merely cited and immediately
released (Veh. Code, §§ 40500, 40504)9;
juana; that while the search for weapons was extensive, including examina-
tions into the campers' gear, clothing and sleeping bags, the officers appar-
ently took no precautions to guard themselves against clearly visible instru-
mentalities such as a hatchet and large rocks at the campsite; and that the
officers allowed the youth to retain possession of a hunting knife and camp-
ing hatchet on the return journey. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 535
notes 5, 6, and 7, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 318-319 notes 5, 6, and 7, 531 P.2d 1099,
at 1102-3 notes 5, 6, and 7 (1975).
8. 7 Cal. 3d 186, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837, 496 P.2d 1205 (1972). Defendant
Simon was arrested for operating a vehicle after dark without headlights
or taillights. Defendant could produce neither a driver's license nor a regis-
tration for the vehicle. In the course of a field search of the defendant,
the arresting officer took a small, plastic bag of marijuana from defendant's
pants pocket. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's order granting
defendant's motion to suppress. The Supreme Court held that the search
did not pertain to the arrest based on the traffic violation and that a search
for weapons following a minor traffic arrest is impermissible unless there
are specific, articulable facts or circumstances giving the arresting officer
reasonable ground$ to believe that the driver is in possession of a weapon.
9. CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 40500 (West 1966) provides:
Whenever a person is arrested for any violation of this code not declared to
be a felony, or for a violation of an ordinance of a city or county relating to
the traffic offenses and he is not immediately taken before a magistrate, as
provided in this chapter, the arresting officer shall prepare in triplicate a
written notice to appear in court or before a person authorized to receive a
deposit of bail, containing the name and address of the person, the license
number of his vehicle, if any, the name and address, when available, of
the registered owner or lessee of the vehicle, the offense charged and the
time and place when and where he shall appear.
CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 40504 (West 1963) provides:
Delivery of notice
(a) The officer shall deliver one copy of the notice to appear to the
arrested person and the arrested person in order to secure release must give
his written promise to appear in court or before a person authorized to
[VOL. 3: 180, 1975] People v. Brisendine
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[Category Two] [T]hose who may or must be taken before a
magistrate and given the option to post bond (Veh. Code, §§ 40302,
4030310; and,
[Category Three] [T]hose who are arrested for felonies and
booked according to the general Penal Code provisions on felony
arrests (Veh. Code, § 403.01; Pen. Code, § 7, subd. (21). 11
The Court detailed the permissible scope of search incident to each
arrest as being:
receive a deposit of bail by signing two copies of the notice which shall be
retained by the officer. Thereupon the arresting officer shall forthwith
release the person arrested from custody.
(b) Any person who signs a written promise to appear with a false or
fictitious name is guilty of a misdemeanor regardless of the disposition of
the charge upon which he was originally arrested.
10. CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 40302 (West 1972) provides:
Mandatory appearance
Whenever any person is arrested for any violation of this code, not
declared to be a felony, the arrested person shall be taken without un-
necessary delay before a magistrate within the county in which the offense
charged is alleged to have been committed and who has jurisdiction of the
offense and is nearest or most accessible with reference to the place where
the arrest is made in any of the following cases:
(a) When the person arrested fails to present his driver's license or other
satisfactory evidence of his identity for examination.(b) When the person arrested refuses to give his written promise to
appear in court.
(c) When the person arrested demands an immediate appearance before
a magistrate.
(d) When the person arrested is charged with violating Section 23102
misdemeanor drunk driving, or 23105 driving under influence of drug or
addiction.
CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 40303 (West 1969) provides:
Optional appearance before a magistrate
Whenever any person is arrested for any of the following offenses and
the arresting officer is not required to take the person without unnecessary
delay before a magistrate, the arrested person shall, in the judgment of the
arresting officer, either be given a 10 days' notice to appear as herein pro-
vided or be taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate within the
county in which the offense charged is alleged to have been committed and
who has jurisdiction of the offense and is nearest or most accessible with
reference to the place where the arrest is made.
11. CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 40301 (West 1959) provides:
Procedure.
Except as provided in this chapter, whenever a person is arrested for any
violation of this code declared to be a felony, he shall be dealt with in like
manner as upon arrest for the commission of any other felony.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 7, Subd. (21) (West 1968) provides:
To "book" signifies the recordation of an arrest in official police records,
and the taking by the police of fingerprints and photographs of the person
arrested, or any of these acts following an arrest.
Category One-citation-release: Absent specific and articulable
facts or circumstances, neither a pat-down nor a limited weapons
search is permissible.
Category Two-magistrate-bond: A pat-down or limited weap-
ons search is permissible.
Category Three-felony-booking: A pat-down or limited weap-
ons search is permissible.' 2
The Court noted that of the three categories listed, Brisendine
could have been placed arguably under either the Category One-
citation-release situation or the Category Two-magistrate-bond
situation in regard to the fire ordinance violation. The Court held
that in the instant case, the "exigencies of the situation" which
required that the officers personally conduct the arrestees from the
campsite to the officers' vehicle, an act which necessitated the
officers' moving "in proximity with the arrestee [s] ", was a specific,
articulable fact which justified a pat-down search for weapons
"even though the charge would ultimately be disposed of by a mere
citation."'13 Citing the balancing test language of the United States
Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 4 the Court determined that the
officers' interest in protecting themselves during the transportation
of the defendants from the primitive location in the nighttime out-
weighed the defendant's interest in protecting his person and effects
from a limited search.' 5
C. Limitations on the scope of the permissible weapons search.
The defendant's third and ultimately successful argument was
that even assuming that the search for weapons was legal in its
12. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 536-37, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 320,
531 P.2d 1099, 1104 (1975).
13. Id. at 536-37, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 320, 531 P.2d at 1104 (1975).
14. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Court quotes at 20-21, "[There is] no ready
test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to
search against the invasion which the search entails."
Defendant was stopped and frisked and a revolver was seized from him
by an officer who had observed defendant and two other men's unusual
conduct which the experienced officer concluded was in contemplation of
a daylight robbery. The Supreme Court upheld the State of Ohio's dismis-
sal of defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the search was reason-
able under the Fourth Amendment where the officer could reasonably con-
clude that criminal activity was "afoot" and that the person with whom
he was dealing might be armed. The Court limited the scope of the search,
however, to a pat-down (commonly called the Terry-type search) of the
outer clothing of the suspect for concealed instruments that might be used
for an assault. Id. at 30-31.
15. The Court stated that it was incumbent upon the officers to escort
the campers and their effects from the campsite because their presence at
the location constituted the offense charged. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal.
3d 528, 541, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 323, 531 P.2d 1099, 1107 (1975).
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inception, the search as conducted nevertheless exceeded its per-
missible scope.
In discussing the permissible scope of the weapons search, the
Court quoted with favor both the limitation language and the
balancing test language of the United States Supreme Court in
Terry v. Ohio (1968).16 The Court noted that in the limitation
language, Terry recognized that "a search which is reasonable in
its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by reason of its
intolerable intensity and scope. '17 The inception-scope dichotomy
in a search situation demands a twofold determination by the
reviewing court:
[1 W]hether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and[2] whether it was reasonably limited in scope to the circum-
stances which justified the interference in the first place.18 (Em-
phasis added.)
Using the limitation and balancing rationales of Terry as an
approved guide, the Court held that this dual-prong "inception-
scope" test must therefore be applied to the three distinguishable
stages of the instant search: 1) the search of the person and the
effects of Brisendine, including the knapsack; 2) the search of the
interior knapsack; and 3) the search into the opaque, plastic bottle
and into the envelopes.
1. The search of the person and effects, including the knapsack.
Defendant Brisendine raised no issue as to the search of his
person.
In support of the search of the knapsack, the People cited Chimel
v. California (1969) 19 for the proposition that the officers could
search the area within the reach of the defendants. While the
Court noted that the testimony left in doubt whether the knapsack
was actually within the reach of any of the campers, the Court
16. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
17. Id. at 17-18.
18. Id. at 20.
19. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The Supreme Court held
that an arresting officer without a search warrant may search not only the
arrestee but also the area "within the immediate control" of the arrestee
from which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
Id. at 762-63, 756-66.
concluded that Chimel was not dispositive of the case in any
event.20
The People recognized that under the Simon rule that in a situa-
tion of a Category One-citation-release traffic violation, to which
the instant fire ordinance violation was analogized, the officer must
point to specific facts or circumstances giving the officer "reason-
able grounds to believe that weapons are present."'21 This Simon
hurdle had been passed by the exigent circumstances of the trans-
portation of the arrestees which was viewed as a specific, articu-
lable fact sufficient to authorize the pat-down.
The Court stated that the traditional rationale of warrantless
searches incident to arrests was twofold: 1) the need to uncover
evidence of the crime, and 2) the need to uncover weapons which
might be used to injure the officer or to effect an escape.2 2 The
Ccurt held that the first rationale for the uncovering of evidence
in the instant case was without merit because there could be neither
"instrumentalities" nor "fruits" of the offense of maintaining a fire
in "high fire hazard area. '23  However, the second rationale for
the search for weapons in the instant case stood on another and
more secure footing and was satisfied. Under the existing circum-
stances of the nighttime arrest in a primitive area requiring the
transportation of the arrestees from the area, the Court concluded
that a "prudent officer" would have cause for a weapons search.2 4
Thus, a search of the personal effects of the arrestees for weapons
was justified even under Simon without a need to determine the
justification under Chimel.
2. The search into the interior of the knapsack.
As to the search into the effects of the arrestees, namely the
knapsack, the Court, citing the balancing language of Terry held
that the intrusion of the pat-down of the knapsack was a relatively
minor intrusion when compared to the risk of danger to the officers
who would have to accompany the campers carrying the knapsack
from the area.
The Court stated that the sole justification for a search, in the
limitation language of Terry, is
20. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 539 note 10, 119 Cal. Rptr. 325,
321 note 10, 531 P.2d 1099, 1105 note 10 (1975).
21. Id. at 538, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 321, 531 P.2d at 1105 (1975).
22. Id. at 539, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 321, 531 P.2d at 1105.
23. Id. at 539, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 322, 531 P.2d at 1106.
24. Id. at 540, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 322, 531 P.2d at 1106.
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the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it [the
search] must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion rea-
sonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs or other hidden
instruments for the assault of the police officer.25
Since the officer in the instant case could not determine from a
visual inspection and tactile pat-down of the knapsack if weapons
were contained within the confines of the bag, the officer was justi-
fied in opening the knapsack to ascertain if such were contained
therein.
3. The search into the bottle and into the envelopes: The "seeable"
commonplaces rule of Brisendine.
In support of the validity of the search into the opaque, plastic
bottle and into the envelopes, the People cited two exceptions to the
warrantless search rule: 1) the plain view doctrine, and 2) the
atypical weapons doctrine.
The Court held that the plain view doctrine was not applicable
to the Brisendine situation as there was no contraband within
the unobstructed view of the officer; the marijuana was veiled by
an opaque, plastic bottle and the dangerous drugs were wrapped
in tinfoil and encased in envelopes.
26
The issue of whether the bottle and envelope could reasonably
be suspected of being atypical weapons lead to the Court's expan-
sion of the rule established in People v. Collins27 (1970) (herein-
after Collins) which states that:
25. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1968).
26. The Court noted for comparison People v. Bock, 6 Cal. 3d 239, 103
Cal. Rptr. 281, 499 P.2d 961 (1971). In Bock the defendant was arrested
at a party at which marijuana was present. The arresting officer, having
reasonable cause to believe that other suspects might be in the house,
searched the upstairs area where he observed a clear, plastic vial containing
marijuana; the vial was located in an open jewelry case on the top of a
dresser. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's
motion to suppress, holding that objects coming in plain view of an officer
who has the right to be in a position to see them are subject to seizure
without a warrant.
27. 1 Cal. 3d 658, 83 Cal. Rptr. 179, 463 P.2d 403 (1970). Police stopped
defendant whose description matched that of a suspect in an auto theft.
During a pat-down of the defendant for weapons, the officer felt a "little
lump" in defendant's pants pocket. Over the protest of the defendant, the
officer removed the object which proved to be a "lid" of marijuana in a
plastic bag. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order to suppress.
[A]n officer who exceeds a pat-down without first discovering an
object which feels reasonably like a knife, gun, or club must be
able to point to specific and articulable facts which reasonably
support a suspicion that the particular suspect is armed with an
atypical weapon which would feel like the object felt during the
pat-down. 28 (Emphasis added.)
The Court referred to People v. Mosher 2 9 as a valid application
of the Collins rule. In Mosher, a watchband which felt like a knife
blade during a Terry-type search of a burglar was validly seized
and was later admitted into evidence in a prosecution against the
burglar for murder of the owner of the watchband.
The expansion of the Collins rule into the Brisendine rule is con-
tained in the Court's statement that, "If such ordinary [common-
place] objects are not to be intruded upon when felt, a fortiori
intrusion is unjustified when the commonplace is seen.13 0  (Em-
phasis in original.)
The Court held that the officers' search for weapons which
was legal in its inception, being warranted by specific, articulable
facts, became illegal when the officers' exceeded the scope of the
limitation by continuing the search, which was now unwarranted
by any specific, articulable facts, into the seeable commonplace
plastic bottle and envelopes.
Emphasizing the limitation rationale of the United State Supreme Court in
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court stated:
To permit officers to exceed the scope of a lawful pat-down when-
ever they feel a soft object by relying upon mere speculation that
the object might be a razor blade concealed in a handkerchief, a$sap', or any other atypical weapon would be to hold that possession
of any object, including a wallet, invites a plenary search of an
individual's person. Such a holding would render meaningless
Terry's requirement that pat-downs be limited in scope absent
articulable grounds for an additional intrusion.
Id., 1 Cal. 3d at 663, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 182, 463 P.2d at 406.
The Court also stated:
Terry v. Ohio, supra, reaffirmed the settled principles that 'a search
which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amend-
ment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope' and that the
'scope of the search must be strictly tied to and justified by' the
circumstances which rendered its initiation possible.
Id., 1 Cal. 3d at 661, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 181, 463 P.2d at 405. Quoting 392 U.S.
1, 17-19.
28. Id., 1 Cal. 3d at 663, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 182, 463 P.2d at 406.
29. 1 Cal. 3d 379, 82 Cal. Rptr. 379, 461 P.2d 659 (1969). In Mosher,
the Court had called attention to the need to distinguish among items by
touch. The Court had noted the validity of making a distinction between
that category of objects which, like the watchband, do feel like a "knife
blade" and that category of objects which like "A box of matches, a plastic
pouch, a pack of cigarettes, a wrapped sandwich, a container of pills, a wal-
let, coins, folded papers, and many other smaller items ... do not ordinar-
ily feel like weapons." (Emphasis added.)
30. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 544, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 325, 531
P.2d 1099, 1109 (1975).
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IV. "A MORE EXACTING STANDARD": CALIFORNIA REJECTS
THE FEDERAL "MINIMUM STANDARD"OF
Robinson AND Gustafson
The pivotal issue in Brisendine was the effect that the California
Supreme Court should give to the United States Supreme Court's
decisions in United States v. Robinson3' (1973) and Gustafson v.
Florida32 (1973). Under either of these cases, which the People
advanced as controlling in the Brisendine situation, the contraband
taken during the search into the bottle and into the envelopes in
the defendant's knapsack would have been validly seized pursuant
to a legal custodial arrest for violation of the fire ordinance.
In giving these decisions the weight of an authority which the
Court was free, but not compelled, to adopt, the Court noted that
the search and seizure issue was decided under art. I, sec. 13 of
the California Constitution "which requires a more exacting stand-
ard for cases arising within this state. 33  The Court thus rejected
31. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). See, supra note 4.
32. 414 U.S. 260 (1973). See, supra note 5.
33. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 545, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 326, 531
P.2d 1099, 1110 (1975).
In rejecting the "minimum standards" of the federal cases, the Court af-
firmed its holding in Collins, 1 Cal. 3d 658, 83 Cal. Rptr. 179, 463 P.2d 403
(1970), supra, note 27, and stated that in California under the Robinson,
414 U.S. 218 (1973), supra, note 4 situation of a minor vehicle arrest for
driving on a revoked license only a pat-down of the arrestee would be al-
lowed prior to transporting the arrestee in a patrol car. The Court cited
CAL. VEICLE CoDE § 40303, subd. (b) which provides that an arrestee for
the violation of driving a vehicle with a revoked license may be taken be-
fore a magistrate and allowed to post bail. The rationale for the California
Court's limitation is that in a warrantless search situation involving a minor
traffic violation, the search is made by the officer for his protection in order
to determine if the arrestee is armed. The search is not made in order to
discover the "fruits" or "instrumentalities" of the traffic offense because
none exist; the act is the violation. With this analogy in mind, the Court
held that there could likewise be no warrantless search for the "fruits" or
"instrumentalities" of a fire ordinance violation: Again, it was the very
act of being in the area and of having the campfire that constituted the
citable offense.
The California Court, however, readily admitted that the United States
Supreme Court held a different view. Indeed, the latter judicial body has
held that an arrest based upon probable cause satisfies the Fourth Amend-
ment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures and "that an
intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional
justification" because "an individual subjected to a custodial arrest retains
no significant Fourth Amendment interest in the privacy of his person."
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 237 (1973).
the "minimum standard" applicable to situations under the Fourth
Amendment. In reaching this decision, the Court stated that it was
unable to accept as valid the analysis presented by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the Robinson and Gustafson de-
cisions.3 4
Having rejected the federal standard, the Court proceeded to
justify its power to establish a higher standard by invoking the
doctrine of federalism35 with accompanying references to state and
federal cases recognizing the validity of such state-federal diver-
gences,3 16 including the more demanding California standards in the
The California Court challenged this view and referred to its holdings
in Simon, 7 Cal. 3d 186, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837, 496 P.2d 1205 (1972).
34. The California Court candidly admitted that, given the same factual
situation as presented in Robinson, it would reach the opposite result that
the United States Supreme Court reached. The Court's analysis of the Rob-
inson holding diagnoses the problem in the following manner:
That opinion proceeds from the premise that 'It is well settled that
a search incident to a lawful arrest is a traditional exception to the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.' (414 U.S. at p.
224.) It then recites that 'The justification or reason for the
authority to search . . . rests quite as much on the need to disarm
the suspect in order to take him into custody as it does on the
need to preserve evidence .... ' (Id. at 234.) While based upon
this need, however, 'The authority to search . . . does not depend
on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular
arrest situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found
upon the person of the suspect.' Thus '[H]aving in the course of
a lawful search come upon the crumpled package of cigarettes, [the
officer] was entitled to inspect it . . . .' (Id. at p. 236.)
We have no quarrel with the proposition that a search incident to
an arrest is a traditional exception to the necessity to obtain a war-
rant, nor with the concept that a portion of its justification is the
need to uncover weapons. We also accept the view that transpor-
tation in a police vehicle per se justifies a limited weapons search,
regardless of the likelihood that a particular arrestee is armed.
However, we have examined the Robinson opinion at length and
remain unable to determine how the final conclusion flows from
these premises. Rather, the converse would seem to be true:
having in the course of a lawful weapons search come upon a
crumpled cigarette package, the officer would have no reasonable
ground to inspect it. Our decisions have invariably required
articulable grounds to inspect, and we decline the inivitation of the
People to abrogate that long-established principle today.
People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 547-548 note 15, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315,
327 note 15, 531 P.2d 1099, 1111 note 15 (1975).
35. By basing its holding "exclusively" on art. I, sec. 13 of the California
Constitution, the Court precluded the potential issue of construing the scope
of the proscriptions under the Fourth Amendment.
36. The Court noted that the United States Supreme Court had affirmed
the rule that the states are the ultimate arbiters of state law and that the
California judiciary had on previous occasions acknowledged that right.
Cf. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967). In Cooper, the Court, in
dictum, stated, "Our holding, of course, does not affect the State's power
to impose higher standards on searches and seizures than required by the
Federal Constitution if it choose to do so." People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal.
3d 528, 548, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 327-28, 531 P.2d 1099, 1111-12. Buttressing
its federalism argument, the Court stated that the California Constitution
is a "document of independent force" and
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area of double jeopardy 37 and the exclusion rule.38 The Court also
cited the historical development of the federal government's adop-
tion of the provisions of the Bill of Rights from the charters of
the colonial states and not vice versa.3 9  Additionally, the Court
referred to the adoption of higher standards than the Robinson and
Gustafson standard by recent judicial decision in two states.40
-that the nation as a whole is composed of distinct geographical
and political entities bound together by a fundamental federal law
but nonetheless independently responsible for safeguarding the
rights of their citizens.
Id. at 551, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 329-30, 531 P.2d at 1113-14. Additionally, the
Court cited the recent passage of art. I, sec. 24 of the California Constitution
which provides: "Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent
on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution." Id. at 551, 119 Cal.
Rptr. at 330, 531 P.2d at 1114.
37. See Curry v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 707, 87 Cal. Rptr. 361, 366,
470 P.2d 345 (1970), rejecting the federal rule of Gori v. United States, 367
U.S. 364, 369 (1961) that the Fifth Amendment proscription against double
jeopardy is not violated when defendant is retried after the court has
granted a mistrial without the defendant's consent but in his interest and
affirming a dismissal under the same circumstances in state prosecutions.
People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 549 note 17, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 328-
329 note 17, 531 P.2d 1099, 1112-13 note 17 (1975).
38. See People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 759-761, 290 P.2d 855, 856-857
(1955). Cited by the Court at 13 Cal. 3d 528, 549, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 328,
531 P.2d 1099, 1112 (1975). California is the only jurisdiction recognizing
a vicarious application of the exclusionary rule so that a defendant may
object to the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the rights of
any other defendant.
39. The Court cites 1 Schwartz, The Bill Of Rights: A Document Of
History (1971) [citations] for the proposition that the colonial revolutionary
charters contained the provisions later adopted by the federal constitution
as the Bill of Rights. This "lesson of history" was not lost on the Court
which also noted that the California Court's decision regarding the exclu-
sionary rule in People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955) came
six years before the United States Supreme Court's decision in Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) making the exclusionary rule binding on the
states. 13 Cal. 3d 528, 549-50, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 328-29, 531 P.2d 1099, 1112-
13.
40. These states are Hawaii and New York.
In State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 36, 520 P.2d 51 (1974), the Hawaii Supreme
Court held violative of art. I, sec. 5 of the Hawaii Constitution the search
of a suspect arrested for armed robbery which resulted in the seizure of
dangerous drugs (Seconal) contained in folded tissue in the suspect's clo-
thing. Underlying the Court's decision was its concern for the reasonable-
ness of the search:
In our view, the right to be free from 'unreasonable' searches and
seizures under article I, section 5 of the Hawaii Constitution is en-
forceable by a rule of reason which requires that governmental
intrustion into the personal privacy of citizens of this state be no
greater in intensity than. absolutely necessary under the circum-
stances.
V. THE DIssENT
The dissent's primary rebuttal to the majority's holding in
Brisendine was a belief that art. I, sec. 13 of the California Consti-
tution paralleled the Fourth Amendment not only in the form of
language but in the substance of meaning such that the California
Court should defer to the construction given the federal proscrip-
tion by the United States Supreme Court in Robinson and Gustaf-
son. Accordingly, the minority would have held that contraband
was seized in a search incident to a lawful custodial arrest.41
The dissent acknowledged that a primary motivation for its
position was a concern for the safety of the officer in an arrest situa-
tion. The dissenting opinion viewed the Brisendine holding as pro-
viding demonstratably less of a safeguard to enforcement officers
under the state law than currently exists under federal law pursu-
ant to the authority of the topical cases. Quoting with favor the ra-
tionale of the United States Supreme Court in Robinson, the dissent
agreed that "The danger to the police officer flows from the fact of
the arrest and its attendant proximity, stress, and uncertainty, and
not from the grounds for the arrest.42 (Emphasis added.)
The dissent further argued that the Terry limitation on the scope
of an investigatory pat-down search when based upon less than
Id. at 36, 520 P.2d at 58-9. The Court held that a warrantless search of
an arrestee must be limited to the disarming of an arrestee where reason
exists to believe that the same is armed and to the discovering of fruits
and instrumentalities of the crime for which the suspect is arrested. Id.
at 36, 520 P.2d at 59-60.
Similarly in People v. Copeland, 354 N.Y.S.2d 399, 77 Misc. 2d 649 (Dist.
Ct. 1974), the New York Court held that a full custodial search of an ar-
restee is prohibited absent special circumstances when the arrest is predi-
cated on a traffic violation. The Court stated, "The requirements of law
enforcement are satisfied by the issuance of a summons, and a police officer
should not be permitted to deviate from that normal ordinary procedure
of summoning a defendant on a minor traffic infraction without further
cause." Id. at 401, 77 Misc. 2d at -.
An interesting result occurred in People v. Kelly, 353 N.Y.S.2d 111, 77
Misc. 2d 264 (Crim. Ct. 1974). Defendant was arrested for operating his
vehicle on a suspended license and he refused to display his driver's license
to the officer upon demand. A field search of his person revealed an alleg-
edly forged license and a quantity of dangerous drugs. The Court denied
defendant's motion to suppress the license, but granted his motion to sup-
press the contraband. The Court stated that despite the United States Su-
preme Court's ruling in Robinson, New York was free to apply its own more
restrictive rule which prohibits searches relating to suspected offenses not
connected with the basis of the arrest. Id. at 117, 77 Misc. 2d at -.
41. Contrary to the view adopted by the majority, the dissenting justices
viewed the acts at the campsite and the duration of the return journey as
constituting a custodial arrest.
42. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 note 5 (1973).
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probable cause should not be carried ,over into the situation involv-
ing a lawful custodial arrest. 43
As to the arguments raised by the issue of federalism, the dissent
stated that the majority sought to avoid the impact of the Robin-
son and Gustafson decisions by invoking the doctrine. The opinion
also noted that the Brisendine holding would result in a confusing
dual state-federal set of standards for search and seizure. Further-
more, the dissent noted that the passage of art. I, sec. 24 did not
necessitate nor should it require a construction to avoid application
of a parallel federal constitutional provision such as the Fourth
Amendment.
The dissent noted that while two states had adopted more
restrictive standards than the federal standard, that four states44
43. 13 Cal. 3d 528, 553-54, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 331-32, 531 P.2d 1099, 1115-
16 (1975).
44. These states are Indiana, Missouri, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin.
In Sizemore v. State, - Ind. App. -, 308 N.E.2d 400 (1974), officers ob-
served the defendant erratically driving a vehicle which had a missing tail
light. The officers arrested the defendant for operating a vehicle without
proper lighting; but prior to making a formal arrest for driving under the
influence and transporting him, the officers conducted a pat down which
revealed a rolled cigarette of marijuana. Defendant's motion to suppress
was denied by the Court with the following statement: "On the basis of
the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the principles expressed in Robin-
son and Gustafson are directly applicable and dispositive of the search of
Sizemore's person in the instant case." Id. at -, 308 N.E.2d 400, 406.
In State v. Cromwell, 509 S.W.2d 144 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974), police officers
stopped the defendant for running a traffic light. Upon the defendant's of-
fering the police a driver's license which he admitted was not his own, the
police arrested him for driving without a license. A search of the defend-
ant's person resulted in the seizing of several .38 caliber cartridges. A sub-
sequent search of the defendant's car revealed a .38 caliber revolver which
had been taken from a security guard during the course of an armed rob-
bery three days earlier. Defendant's motion to suppress the introduction
of the revolver was denied. The Court held that these searches were inci-
dent to a lawful arrest upon the authority of the twin federal cases. Id.
at 146.
The Oklahoma decision, Hughes v. State, 522 P.2d 1331 (Okla. Crim. App.
1974) held that under the Oklahoma Constitution decisions by the United
States Supreme Court bound the state judiciary. The defendant was ar-
rested for reckless driving, handcuffed and placed in custody. A search of
the defendant's person revealed dangerous drugs (codine pills). Defend-
ant's motion to suppress the contraband was denied despite his protest that
the pills were not the fruit of the crime of reckless driving. The Court
held Article 3, §§ 1 and 3 of the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma made
binding the holdings of Robinson and Gustafson on the state: "It is, there-
had adopted the federal standard defined in the Robinson and
Gustafson.
In sum, the dissenting justices would follow Robinson and
Gustafson and would overrule Simon and similar cases to the
extent that the same are inconsistent with the recent federal de-
cisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
People v. Brisendine, holding that the permissible scope of a
warrantless search of person and effects of a suspect arrested for
a minor non-vehicular offense where specific, articulable facts
warrant a limited weapons search does not justify a search into
seeable commonplaces, typifies the controversy in recent Fourth
Amendment cases. The controversy of the protection that is to be
afforded to the arresting officer and the protection that is to be
afforded to the arrestee's integrity are matters that can never be
put into absolute rules. As the Court states,
Once again we emphasize that in reviewing a warrantless search
to determine the reasonableness of its breadth a court is ill-
advised to apply hard and fast rules.46
The Court in Brisendine has affirmed its traditional view that
the ground for the arrest determines the scope of the search. The
Court demands that the arresting officer point to specific articu-
lable facts or circumstances justifying the weapons search in those
arrests where such a search is not authorized on the basis of the
arrest itself. In refusing to conform to the minimum standards
set forth by the federal judiciary, the California Court has effec-
tively shown that the tools of law enforcement must themselves
conform to the law.
DONALD E. BUDDENBAUM
fore, elementary that we must turn to the decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States in interpreting the Fourth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion in determining the legality of the search and seizure here involved,
notwithstanding any prior decision of this Court." Id. at 1333.
In State v. Mabra, 61 Wis. 613, 213 N.W.2d 545 (1974) the defendant and
defendant's wife were arrested for armed robbery of a tavern. A custodial
search of the defendant's wife at the police station prepatory to incarcera-
tion and made to identify her personal belongings revealed $634, much of
it in small change. The Court held that this money had been properly ad-
mitted into evidence at the trial because an article coming into an officer's
possession in the course of a lawful search is admissible under the rationale
of previous state cases and recent federal decisions. The Court summarized
the effect of Robinson and Gustafson upon prior state cases in these words:
"Our prior decisions requiring a reasonable search to be directed to the ob-
ject or purpose of the arrest are no longer viable." Id. at 613, 213 N.W.2d
45. 13 Cal. 3d 528, 541, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 323, 531 P.2d 1099, 1107 (1975).
